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THE HUMBLE AND THE TREASONOUS:
JUDGE-MADE JURISDICTION LAW
Ann Althouse*
"We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction
which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or
the other would be treason to the [Clonstitution."
Chief Justice John Marshall'
WHEN THE SUPREME Court of the United States makes ju-
risdictional doctrine, does it constitute judicial "usurpation" of
legislative power?2 Is the doctrine of abstention institutionalized
"treason"? 3 There are many attacks leveled at the Court's juris-
dictional lawmaking, most of them grounded in policy and differ-
ing notions of federalism. But what are we to make of the separa-
tion of powers critique?
To Professors Doernberg4 and Redish,5 complex doctrines of
federal jurisdiction become eminently simple if only we recognize
that in our constitutional system, Congress, and Congress alone,
controls the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. Statutes dic-
tate the extent of the federal courts' power, and the courts should
just follow the statutes and stop making up doctrines that restrict
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School. J.D., New York
University Law School (1981). 1 would like to thank Jack Beermann, Steve Herzberg, and
Vicki Schultz for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper. I would also like to
thank Bill Marshall for inviting me to participate in the panel on The New Separation of
Powers, Federal Courts Section, at the 1990 AALS Meeting and to write this Comment in
conjunction with the panel.
1. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).
2. Redish, Judge-Made Abstention and the Fashionable Art of "Democracy Bash-
ing," 40 CASE W. RFs. L. REv. 1023, 1032 (1989-90) [hereinafter Redish, Symposium].
3. Doernberg, "You Can Lead A Horse to Water. . .'" The Supreme Court's Re-
fusal to Allow the Exercise of Original Jurisdiction Conferred by Congress, 40 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 999, 1002 (1989-90).
4. See id. at 1018 (the Court's rejection of jurisdiction ignores a congressional com-
mand to exercise the same).
5. See Redish, Symposium, supra note 2, at 1032-33 (discussing the "intricate net-
work of statutorily dictated federal judicial abstention" rules established by Congress and
questioning "how Congress could have made its goal clearer").
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their own power. Commentators are wasting their time worrying
about whether the state courts can be trusted or whether federal
courts are needed to vindicate federal rights. The courts cannot
legitimately consider these "policy matters" in determining
whether they have jurisdiction. The statutes are in place. Congress
has, pursuant to its proper role in our constitutional structure,
considered all the policy questions. The courts, assuming what
Professor Redish has called an attitude of "humility,"'6 must exer-
cise the jurisdiction given. In the heated words of Chief Justice
John Marshall, anything less is "treason to the [C]onstitution."'
Such a vision of the structure of federal jurisdiction seems
very tidy, predictable, and logical. Unfortunately, it rests squarely
and heavily on several unsupportable notions: that the existing ju-
risdictional statutes are so perfectly clear that they leave no room
for varying interpretations;8 that it is possible for a judge to ascer-
tain legislative meaning unaffected by the judge's ideas about
what jurisdiction should be; and that it is possible for the outside
observer to determine whether the judge has adhered to this
proper form of decision-making.
Realistically, one might observe that the separation of powers
critique is really just a lawyer's tool that might convince judges
who endorse judicial restraint that they have no discretion to de-
cline civil rights cases. Even if the separation of powers vision is
pure fantasy, one could say, it is a useful fantasy: it works to un-
dercut the abstention doctrine. Ironically, the seemingly pristine
logic of separation of powers, which purports to exclude any non-
legislative policy-making, may itself rest on the policy judgment
that federal courts should provide an open forum to federal rights
claimants. What may be worse than the mere irony and internal
inconsistency of this explanation is that separation of powers logic
is quite unlikely to work as planned.
As this Comment suggests, embracing separation of powers
6. See id. at 1031 (judicial humility in the face of jurisdictional statutes is required,
short of a finding of unconstitutionality); see also Redish, Federal Common Law. Political
Legitimacy, and the Interpretive Process: An "Institutionalist" Perspective, 83 Nw. U. L.
REv. 761, 784 (1989) ("[l~t is important for the judiciary to approach [statutory interpre-
tation] with the humility dictated by its role as an unrepresentative organ within our repre-
sentational democratic structure.").
7. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 404 (1821); see Doernberg, supra
note 3, at 1002.
8. See Redish, Symposium, supra note 2, at 1026 (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19
U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821)) (judicial abstention ignores the "carefully structured
pre-existing legislative network").
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logic would probably not lead the Court to open the federal courts
to the cases that now meet the abstentiqn barrier. If anything,
separation of powers logic would threaten to restrict access to fed-
eral courts more than the flexible, judge-made doctrines that now
prevail. On the other hand, if the separation of powers theory,
with its severe principles of judicial restraint and passiveness, did
increase access to federal courts, those courts might find it diffi-
cult to summon up the activism needed to give a wide scope to
individual rights.
I. THE ATTACK ON JUDGE-MADE JURISDICTION LAW AND THE
PREFERENCE FOR FEDERAL COURT
The separation of powers critique rests on the belief that
when the Court lays down a particular jurisdictional rule, one can
tell whether the Court is restricting itself to proper statutory inter-
pretation or is instead making up a rule based on its own ideas
about what federal jurisdiction ought to be. The judiciary either
moves circumspectly, in a way wholly determined by textual
edicts, or it leaps about arrogantly, exercising the unauthorized
power to make new law. Professor Redish writes about statutory
interpretation and the creation of judge-made jurisdictional doc-
trine as if they are two distinctly independent processes. When the
Court operates in its statutory interpretation mode, presumably, it
simply and humbly restates the law as dictated by Congress.
When it lapses into its judge-made doctrine mode, though, it ille-
gitimately strikes out on its own and negates the will'of Congress.
Of course, if the Court uses the Constitution to negate the will of
Congress, it operates in a third mode -constitutional interpreta-
tion - and regains its legitimacy.9
But the Court's jurisdictional doctrine-making will not fit into
such neat compartments. Rather, its jurisdictional work forms a
highly complex and interdependent structure that lacks clear divi-
sions between the truly constitutional, the completely statutory,
and the decidedly judge-made. Without doubt, some of the
Court's written opinions claim to rely on a purely constitutional or
statutory basis, while other opinions appear to float free of these
textual sources, buoyed by notions of federalism, equity, and judi-
cial restraint. For example, the Court itself bills Younger v. Har-
9. See id. at 1031 (short of a finding of unconstitutionality, the Court lacks authority
to review the congressional vesting of jurisdiction).
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ris ° as a judge-made doctrine untied to any textual source and
characterizes Mitchum v. Foster" as a painstaking exegesis of
section 1983.12 Taken at face value and viewed in isolation,
Mitchum may appear on the surface to be a purely statutory exer-
cise; and thus, according to Professor Redish's approach, a "hum-
ble" and appropriate judicial pronouncement.1 3 And, likewise,
Younger may seem like a blatant usurpation of legislative power;
"treason" according to Professor Doernberg, invoking Chief Jus-
tice Marshall. 4
There is, however, a reason why the Court spoke one way in
Mitchum and another in Younger, a reason that has nothing to do
with whether one was humble and the other treasonous. Because
of the inherent restraint in nonaction, openly declining to exercise
jurisdiction has seemed acceptable to the Court. The unac-
ceptability of openly acting beyond the prescribed jurisdiction, on
the other hand, looks obvious. Thus, the Court creates jurisdic-
tional doctrines like Younger that express toleration for the idea
that jurisdiction exists and yet cannot be exercised. But the Court
would not compose a doctrine that expressed toleration for the
idea that a federal court may decide a case and bind the parties
when jurisdiction does not exist.15 When the Court is inclined to-
ward restraint, it has not felt inhibited from articulating free-
standing doctrines like abstention. 6 Inhibition sets in, however,
when activism appeals to the Court. In such situations, the Court
confines itself to statutory or constitutional interpretation.'" Nev-
ertheless, it may find ways to avoid undesirable limitations that
are every bit as effective as freestanding, admittedly judge-made
doctrines.' 8 This basic paradox of jurisdiction - that restraint is a
10. 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971) ("national policy" forbids federal courts from enjoining
pending state court proceedings).
11. 407 U.S. 225, 226 (1972) ("The question before us is whether this 'Act of Con-
gress' comes within the 'expressly authorized' exception of the anti-injunction statute so as
to permit a federal court in a § 1983 suit to grant an injunction to stay a proceeding
pending in a state court.").
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
13. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
14. See Doernberg, supra note 3, at 1019 (finding treason to the Constitution to be
rampant and contending that the Younger Court refused to accept the original congres-
sional grant of jurisdiction as well as that mandated by the Anti-Injunction Act).
15. See, e.g., Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 513 (1869) (noting that in
any case the "first question necessarily is one of jurisdiction").
16. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
17. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 32-45.
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form of activism and activism a form of restraint - dates back at
least to Marbury v. Madison.9
Because the Court only uses admittedly judge-made doc-
trines when it seeks to restrict jurisdiction, the strict separation of
powers approach may appeal to those who, like Professor Redish,
favor maximum access to federal courts for the enforcement of
constitutional rights.20 If this preference for federal courts, rather
than the appeal of abstract theory, motivates those who embrace
the separation of powers approach then it is basically a strategic
alternative to the federalism-based arguments that stress the im-
portance of federal courts and the inferiority of state courts.
Moreover, if the preference for federal courts and the value of
state courts are fundamental to jurisdictional decision-making,
then we must inevitably return to that debate. The separation of
powers argument does not provide an easy escape from the
problems of federal jurisdiction. It is another way to argue in
favor of one solution to those problems.
By switching from policy-oriented arguments about federal
interests, rights, and federalism, and embracing instead an ab-
stract concept, one may feel entitled to claim some sort of intellec-
tual high ground. It then becomes possible to denounce opponents
as unprincipled. 21 The problem is, one cannot count on the ab-
stract concept to lead to the desired result. The same tool in the
hands of a justice who favors a good measure of deference to the
states is unlikely to produce increased access to federal court -
as the next section of this Comment will show.
By professing unconcern for practical reality and a pure, un-
alloyed love for an idea, one loses control over outcomes and ar-
gues unwittingly for bad results. Despite the seemingly "princi-
pled" quality of the separation of powers argument, there is
something unprincipled about embracing an abstraction and tak-
ing it to its logical limit, without the stabilizing effect of consider-
19. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
20. In his Article, Judicial Parity, Litigant Choice, and Democratic Theory: A Com-
ment on Federal Jurisdiction and Constitutional Rights, 36 UCLA L. REv. 329, 368
(1988) [hereinafter Redish, Judicial Parity], Professor Redish first emphasized his strong
conviction that state courts are inferior to federal courts and thus that questions of federal
constitutional law belonged in federal court; and then concluded that the abstention doc-
trine violated the separation of powers doctrine.
21. See Redish, Symposium, supra note 2, at 1030 ("By investing the unrepresenta-
tive judiciary with the authority to determine these 'right' answers, however, these scholars
would effectively establish jurists as the equivalent of Platonic-philosopher kings. ... ).
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ing policy implications. The vision of the Court reasoning ab-
stractly about textual language and disembodied principles,
insensible to the effects of its decisions, is truly frightening.22 For-
tunately, the Court has never pursued that kind of blind role. In-
deed, I doubt that the human mind is even capable of functioning
this way, though it is certainly capable of attempting or pretend-
ing to function this way - and of believing that it has succeeded.
Professor Redish must deny that his advocacy of separation
of powers analysis is tied to a desire for increased federal court
access. To do otherwise would destroy his argument, as well as his
belief in his argument, which I am sure is sincere. Because his
separation of powers analysis attempts to exclude policy judg-
ments, he cannot advocate its use for reasons other than the value
of keeping governmental powers separate. He maintains it is
merely a coincidence that this theory also produces a result he
endorses as a matter of policy.2" Professor Redish writes as he
would have the duly humble judge write: using appropriately judi-
cial methods, analyzing only statutes and constitutional provisions,
and refusing to perceive any play in them.24 He may genuinely
lack any awareness that his own thinking about logical, abstract
precepts is influenced by his ideas about how things ought to work
in real life. But when a single mind is doing the thinking, I find it
very difficult to believe that it is a mere coincidence when logical
calculations from statutory and constitutional texts match policy
judgments.2 5
22. I am reminded of a conversation that I and two other law professors once had
with a philosophy professor. The philosophy professor contended that a court faced with
the question of when life support devices could be withdrawn from a patient should simply
define "death" and then determine if this particular patient was "dead" according to that
definition. The court should not think about the consequences of this definition and deter-
mination. The proper approach involved reasoning in the abstract and not asking directly
which person should die. It would be "unprincipled" for the judge to connect the decision
to that very real result. The way to keep judges "judicial," and to make it appropriate to
entrust such decisions to them, is to confine them to a realm of abstract reason.
When the three law professors (who in most matters would represent a broad spec-
trum of legal positions) persisted in arguing that this vision of legal decision-making was
both dangerous and not humanly possible, the philosophy professor left the room.
23. See Redish, Symposium, supra note 2, at 1033.
24. See id. at 1030-32.
25. Cf. Wells, The Impact of Substantive Interests on the Law of Federal Courts,
30 WM. & MARY L. REv. 499, 499 (1988) ("substantive factors exert a powerful and often
unrecognized influence over the resolution of jurisdictional issues").
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II. WHAT KIND OF JURISDICTION LAW WOULD REALLY
FOLLOW FROM THE SEPARATION OF POWERS APPROACH?
What would happen if the Court took the separation of pow-
ers critique to heart? It would not construct a nonstatutory, free-
standing doctrine like Younger, of course. But would federal court
access really increase? The Court could not use strict separation
of powers analysis as a means of pulling an occasional "misshapen
stone" - such as Younger - from the entire "grotesque struc-
ture" of federal jurisdiction.26 It would need to rebuild the entire
structure on a foundation of strict separation of powers, analyzing
all statutory and constitutional questions with the understanding
that no judge-made doctrines could ever be employed to mitigate
the harsher effects of those decisions.
Let us reconsider the Younger-Mitchum sequence of cases as
if the Court had adopted the strict separation of powers approach
advocated by Professors Redish and Doernberg. A state court
criminal defendant has decided he would prefer to transform his
federal defense into an affirmative claim for relief under section
1983. Filing his case in federal court, he asserts that the state
prosecutor, acting "under color of state law," is imminently
threatening to deprive him of a federal right by prosecuting.him
under a state statute that violates his federal right of free speech.
His claim fits within the language of section 198327 and is thus
within the related jurisdictional grant.2 8
26. The "building" imagery is courtesy of Justice Jackson from his opinion in Mich-
elson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948). Speaking of the judge-made rules that gov-
erned when and how litigants in a criminal case could use evidence of character, Justice
Jackson worried that "[t]o pull one misshapen stone out of the grotesque structure is more
likely simply to upset its present balance between adverse interests than to establish a
rational edifice." Id. at 486.
27. It is also necessary, in rebuilding the entire federal jurisdictional structure, to
reanalyze the interpretation of § 1983 in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). See Wells,
Why Professor Redish is Wrong About Abstention, 19 GA. L. REV. 1097, 1097-98 (1985)
(viewing Monroe's interpretation of section 1983 as judge-made law and thus abstention as
an appropriate judge-made limitation). While Professor Redish argues that the Court was
merely interpreting the law in Monroe, see Redish, Judicial Parity, supra note 19, at 346-
49 ("The point ignored in Professor Well's analysis is that the Court's expansive construc-
tion of the substantive civil rights cause of action . . . does not purport to be purely judge-
made law, but rather assumes the democratically protective mantle of statutory interpreta-
tion."), in doing so he indulges in the same kind of specious arguments criticized in this
comment, infra notes 39-47 and accompanying text.
28. 28 U.S.C. § 13 43(a)(4) (1982).
Such a claim also "arises under" federal law within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(1982), though it may not have met the jurisdictional amount that still applied at the time.
10411989-90]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Another statute, however, presents a problem. Under the
Anti-Injunction Act, a federal court "may not grant an injunction
to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized
by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction,
or to protect or effectuate its judgments."29 (In the actual
Younger case, the Court skipped over this statutory issue and cre-
ated its freestanding abstention doctrine.) This statute, to which
the federal courts in their strict adherence to separation of powers
must wholly defer, presents an obstacle to jurisdiction. Yet there
is also a question of interpretation: is section 1983 an "expressly
authorized exception" to the Anti-Injunction Act? 30 (In Mitchum,
decided a year after Younger, the Court held that it was.) Section
1983 certainly makes no express reference to the Anti-Injunction
Act. Legislative history indicates that the authors of section 1983
were concerned about the problem of state courts' actually con-
tributing to the deprivations of federal rights,- and moreover, they
had no confidence in the state courts' capacity to enforce federal
rights.31 The express text of the statute, though, does not specifi-
cally authorize the injunction of state courts.3 2 If the Court de-
cides it has power to give relief despite the Anti-Injunction Act, is
it acting in a humbly deferential fashion or is it shaping jurisdic-
tion according to its own conception of how things ought to be?
Suppose the Court, despite its increased humility in the face
of congressional enactments, sees that it can push the "expressly
authorized" statutory language in the direction that suits its con-
ception of what federal jurisdiction ought to be (or what it
imagines Congress must have intended). Would the Court find
that section 1983 is an "expressly authorized exception" if it also
believed that it was powerless to construct an abstention doctrine
to control how frequently state court defendants could move their
federal questions into federal court? Without a device such as ab-
stention, any criminal defendant with a motion to suppress evi-
29. 28 U.S.C § 2283 (1982).
30. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 282-83 (1971).
31. See id. at 240 ("Proponents of [§ 1983] noted that state courts were being used
to harass and injure individuals, either because the state courts were powerless to stop
deprivations or were in league with those who were bent upon abrogation of federally pro-
tected rights.")
32. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Cf. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234,
243 (1985) (applying a high standard of scrutiny before finding that federal statutes au-
thorize suit against a state in federal court and thus abrogate eleventh amendment
immunity).
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dence allegedly seized in violation of the fourth amendment (to
name but one of the many federal constitutional claims that arise
in criminal cases) might try to initiate a federal lawsuit. This free
access to federal court would create an appalling inefficiency and
place a heavy burden on both the state court, which must wait for
the federal answer to a question that it could have answered, and
the federal court, which will be pressured to decide a case quickly
so that the state litigation could proceed."a I would guess that the
Court, aware of the uncontrolled disruption of state procedure and
wasteful allocation of judicial resources, would conclude that sec-
tion 1983 is not an "expressly authorized exception" to the Anti-
Injunction Act.34
The Younger-Mitchum chronology supports this prediction.
The Younger Court itself evaded the Anti-Injunction Act problem
and went on instead to create an abstention doctrine, which was
manifestly unnecessary if the Anti-Injunction Act flatly barred re-
lief. Mitchum decided the statutory issue one year later, after the
Younger doctrine was in place to ensure that removing the Anti-
Injunction Act bar would not yield the disruption and waste de-
scribed above. Without Younger, could Mitchum have happened?
Because the Court was able to create a flexible abstention doctrine
in Younger, it could keep most federal questions that originated in
a state court proceeding in the state court in the first instance,"
and it could still create a narrow route for the few, exceptional
cases in which the state court is inadequate to deal with the fed-
eral question." If the Anti-Injunction Act barred relief, on the
33. Alternatively, other doctrines, such as ripeness, or the irreparable injury require-
ment for an injunction, could be developed as alternatives to Younger. Redish, Abstention,
Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71, 92-95
(1984) [hereinafter Redish, Abstention]. It is hard to see the value of throwing out
Younger only to replace it with doctrines that are just as judge-made and that are designed
to achieve practically the same result.
34. See supra text accompanying notes 29-31.
35. These questions would still be subject to federal review by the Supreme Court or
by a federal habeas court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982) ("The Supreme Court, a Justice
thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application in behalf of a
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. . . . [after] the applicant has
exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State. ... )
36. The Younger abstention doctrine provides for a series of exceptions which all,
save one, can be characterized in terms of the state court's adequacy to handle the federal
claim. There is no abstention if the proceeding lacks jurisdiction to handle the federal
question, Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 425-26 (1979), or if proceeding is biased, Gibson
v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973), or if the proceeding is not "judicial in nature," New
Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council, 109 S. Ct. 2506 (1989). But see Los Angeles v. Lyons,
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other hand, this flexibility would vanish: the separation of powers
approach would have yielded even less federal court access than
the course the Supreme Court actually took.
Alternatively, the Court, with due humility, could have ar-
rived at the same basic doctrinal structure that now exists, using
purely statutory interpretation. Mitchum, surveying the legislative
history of section 1983, emphasized that Congress was concerned
that the state courts were actually "being used to harass and in-
jure individuals, either because the state courts were powerless to
stop deprivations or were in league with those who were bent upon
abrogation of federally protected rights."37 Citing precisely this
congressional concern, the Court could hold that section 1983 ex-
pressly authorizes injunctions against state courts - but only
when those courts are actually implicated in the violation of fed-
eral rights, either through active abuse of federal rights or by fail-
ing to provide an adequate forum for their adjudication.38
III. THE REAL AND THE FAKE STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
If the Court could derive the equivalent of the Younger doc-
trine from an interpretation of the Anti-Injunction Act, does that
mean that "treason" depends upon the formulation used? We
might attempt to assure ourselves that if the Court were to em-
brace this interpretation, it would merely be an attempt to cover
up its treason by disguising illicit judge-made law as statutory in-
terpretation. But is not Mitchum judge-made law dressed up as
461 U.S. 95, 112 (1983) (citing Younger and relying on "equitable restraint" when faced
with enjoining nonjudicial state officers); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378 (1976)
(same).
In addition, there is no abstention if the prosecution has instituted proceedings in bad
faith or for harassment purposes when it means that the state court is never able to address
the federal claim. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 47-48 (1971) (explaining Dom-
browski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965) (permitting injunction prohibiting the enforcement
of certain state criminal statutes)).
The one exception to Younger abstention that has nothing to do with state court ade-
quacy arises when the federal lawsuit challenges a state statute that is "flagrantly and
patently violative of express constitutional provisions in every clause, sentence and para-
graph, and in whatever manner and against whomever an effort might be made to apply
it." Younger, 401 U.S. at 53-54 (quoting Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 402 (1941)). This
exception has never been used, however. Nor does it make sense: if the state courts can
ever be trusted to enforce any federal law, they should be trusted when the constitutional
question is most clearcut.
37. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 240 (1971).
38. For a discussion of the Younger exceptions in terms of the adequacy of the state
court, see supra note 36.
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statutory interpretation? Professor Redish, himself, has called
Mitchum "a highly questionable opintion" 3 9 and "one of the most
bizarre contortions of Supreme Court analysis,' 40 but he still con-
siders it "insulated from a separation-of-powers critique."'4 1 Ac-
cording to Professor Redish, Mitchum's difficulties stem from poor
reasoning 42 and not from the desire to make jurisdiction conform
to the judicial notion of what jurisdiction should be; Mitchum,
therefore, does not violate separation of powers. In Professor Red-
ish's words, it wears "the democratically protective mantle of stat-
utory interpretation. 43
When Professor Redish writes about the Anti-Injunction Act
now, he takes it for granted that Mitchum represents the true
meaning of that statute.4 4 He contends that the statutory jurisdic-
tional structure is utterly clear and could not be made clearer:
Congress has told the federal courts they have jurisdiction over
civil rights cases, and it has also barred injunctions in some in-
stances, not including civil rights cases, as outlined in the Anti-
Injunction Act.4 5 Yet how can the Anti-Injunction Act be consid-
ered clear given the serious problems with Mitchum? Are we to
approve of Mitchum, even though it was wrongly decided, because
it was written with proper humility? Even if we do approve of it,
can we use it as a basis for claiming that Congress clearly in-
tended to empower the federal courts to enjoin ongoing state pro-
ceedings whenever a plaintiff states a claim that falls within sec-
tion 1983 (as interpreted - humbly? - by Monroe v. Pape46)?
In another article, Professor Redish conceded that even statu-
tory interpretation violates the separation of powers credo if it is
39. Redish, Abstention, supra note 33, at 86.
40. Id. at 87 ("an 'implied' express exception . . .[is] an oxymoron if ever there was
one").
41. Id. (Professor Redish noted that it is insulated "at least to the extent it is applied
to bar injunctions of ongoing state proceedings.")
42. Id.
Ignoring the questionable connection between the Mitchum Court's interpretation and
congressional intent, Professor Doernberg flatly states that "Congress intended" that the
federal courts would issue injunctions against state courts without restraint since the Court
in Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972), "held that the first exception [to the Anti-
Injunction Act] includes actions brought under section 1983." Doernberg, supra note 3, at
1019.
43. Redish, Judicial Parity, supra note 19, at 349.
44. See Redish, Symposium, supra note 2, at 1032 nn. 37-39.
45. See id. at 1031-32 (suggesting that Congress vested this power in the federal
courts because it questioned the state courts' commitment to protecting civil rights).
46. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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"so devoid of even colorable support that it amounts to little more
than a ruse for naked judicial lawmaking. 147 But if Mitchum does
not violate separation of powers, it is difficult to imagine the Court
going too far as long as it speaks in terms of constitutional and
statutory interpretation. Deciding whether a particular decision is
"real" statutory interpretation (wearing "the democratically pro-
tective mantle of statutory interpretation") or "fake" statutory in-
terpretation (mere "naked judicial lawmaking") is a task inescap-
ably tinged with subjectivity. As the Court's observers, how do we
decide if we see real or fake, clothed or naked interpretations? I
would suggest that we see real, clothed, judicial decision-making
when we agree with the result, just as Professor Redish agreed
with the result in Mitchum.
There is no way to choose the right answer by asking which is
the real statutory interpretation and which is the fake. The judge's
sense of what federal jurisdiction ought to be will inevitably affect
statutory interpretation, just as it affects the creation of freestand-
ing doctrines. It is not necessarily that the judge tries to disguise
policy-based decisions as statutory interpretation. A judge operat-
ing humbly and faithfully within the separation of powers model
would naturally frame decisions in terms of statutory construction.
By the same token, a Supreme Court observer who believes the
separation of powers credo, like Professor Redish or Professor
Doernberg, would not determine which decisions fail to align with
the observer's favored policies and, on that basis, pick which deci-
sions are mere "naked judicial lawmaking." Yet that observer
may very well perceive "fake" statutory interpretation in the deci-
sions that reach results they disfavor.
IV. WHO SAYS THE CONSTITUTION GIVES CONGRESS
EXCLUSIVE CONTROL OVER FEDERAL JURISDICTION?
The Supreme Court extensively shapes federal court jurisdic-
tion, both expanding and constricting it, making it conform to its
ideas about what jurisdiction should be. It will continue to shape
jurisdiction this way regardless of what conventions of opinion-
writing bind it. Unlike Professors Redish and Doernberg, I do not
find this process disturbing. The consciousness of the real effects
of decision-making is an indispensable and desirable element of
47. Redish, Judicial Parity, supra note 18, at 348 (critizing the interpretation of §
1983 in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961)).
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judging, not an illicit deviation from the judicial role.
But what about the role of Congress in controlling federal
jurisdiction? Does not the express constitutional text require the
Court to accept the lines drawn by Congress? Think again: what
constitutional textual source denies the judiciary any control over
its own jurisdiction? Article III only provides: "The Judicial
Power of the United States shall be vested . . . in such inferior
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and estab-
lish."48 It takes an act of judicial interpretation to determine that
those words yield Congress plenary power over the scope of fed-
eral jurisdiction. In his original draft of his Article for this Sym-
posium,19 Professor Redish mentioned, but glossed over, this point.
He cited the article III language and added that "no one today
seriously questions" Congress's power over federal jurisdiction.5
Apparently, longstanding acceptance should deflect our attention
from the actual text of the Constitution when the question is Con-
gress's authority over jurisdiction - but not when the question is
the Court's authority. Professor Redish went on to say this "con-
gressional authority makes perfect sense."'" But to discuss govern-
mental power in terms of its "sense" is to make a policy argu-
ment; and Professor Redish has taken great pains to forbid policy
arguments with respect to judicial power to make jurisdictional
law. In the new version of his Article, Professor Redish has
scratched this problematic argument, but he has put nothing in its
place. I am left wondering about the paradox: How do we know
that the Court exceeds its power in contributing to the law of ju-
risdiction when the rule that Congress alone controls jurisdiction
itself comes from the Court? Is it "treason to the [C]onstitution"
48. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
49. Professor Redish changed his Article substantially after my Comment and Pro-
fessor Beermann's Comment were presented at the Symposium. See Beermann, "Bad" Ju-
dicial Activism and Liberal Federal Courts Doctrine: A Comment on Professor Doernberg
and Professor Redish, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1049, 1049 n.* (1989-90).
50. Redish, Abstract: Representational Democracy and the Law of Federal Jurisdic-
tion, 1, 9 (1989) (unpublished manuscript on reserve at the Case Western Reserve Law
Review office prepared in anticipation of the Symposium).
51. Id. at 10.
This "perfect sense" stems from the way jurisdictional provisions are often important
to the success of a substantive legislative program. See id. Even this policy argument -
which the Court could not even consider if it were dedicated to the style of thought Profes-
sor Redish advocates - is not convincing. It only shows why the Court should not defy or
undercut grants of jurisdiction. It does not explain why the Court should have no role in
contributing to the development of jurisdictional provisions in a way that supports the gen-
eral goals laid out in the statute. See infra text accompanying notes 56-58.
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to decline the jurisdiction given? 52 The source of the treason-to-
decline-jurisdiction rule was Chief Justice Marshall, a humble
judge, who had no authority (according to Professor Redish) to
make jurisdictional rules.
The notion of judicial passive-obligation in the face of con-
gressional dominance is.just as judge-made as the idea that the
judiciary retains some power to shape its own jurisdiction along
with Congress. This is not to say that the Constitution leaves the
judiciary wholly unrestrained. The jurisdictional statutes provide
the general outlines that limit judicial lawmaking. The Court
could not, for example, interpret the grant of federal question ju-
risdiction to impose a $100,000 jurisdictional amount. 53 But judi-
cial interpretation of statutes is an inevitable aspect of legislation;
and, except where the statutory language is completely clear, in-
terpretation is unavoidably influenced by judicial notions of what
jurisdiction should be.
Because Congress retains the power to rewrite jurisdiction
grants to undo any unwanted judicial accretions, it is difficult to
take the threat to democracy seriously. Professor Redish attempts
to create the impression that the Court blatantly defies utterly
clear statutes, and that the Congress is at a loss to think of a way
to amend the statutes to make them more clear (short of saying
"and we really mean it" or "read our lips"). Yet it seems per-
fectly obvious that if Congress wanted to eliminate the Younger
doctrine, it could simply amend section 1983 to add genuinely
clear language, such as: "The federal courts may enjoin ongoing
state court proceedings, notwithstanding 28 U.S.C. § 2283, and
they shall not abstain in deference to such proceedings, despite the
capacity of the state court to enforce the federal claim asserted
under this section." If the Court were to continue to authorize
abstention after an amendment like this, I would join Professor
Redish in denouncing the Court for "judicial usurpation at its
most indefensible extreme. '55 Because Congress can respond to
the Court's opinions in this way, and because Congress retains the
power to end the Court's jurisdiction-shaping role with unambigu-
ous and express language, there is no separation of powers prob-
52. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 808 (1821).
53. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982) (no textual reference to jurisdictional
amount) with 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982) (for federal jurisdiction in diversity cases, the
amount in controversy must exceed $50,000).
54. Redish, Symposium, supra note 2, at 14.
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lem - certainly no problem as outrageous as Professors Redish
and Doernberg claim. Younger may be inadvisable as a matter of
federalism and policy, and it may be wrongly decided as a matter
of statutory interpretation, but it is not an assault on democracy." 5
In practice, the Court's role in shaping and "fine-tuning" 6
jurisdiction has been largely supportive of Congress, not adver-
sarial as the "separationists" would have it. Judge-made doctrines
qualify and accommodate statutes that are written in general
terms and that cannot anticipate the realities of litigation encoun-
tered by judges. Judges are therefore in a better position to fill out
some of the details in jurisdictional statutes.
There is good reason to think Congress implicitly authorizes
this kind of law-making or would authorize it, if it gave the mat-
ter any thought. Congress relies on the courts to adapt legislation
and to avoid undesirable and unanticipated results, such as, per-
haps, interfering with ongoing state court proceedings in which
federal rights can be enforced. Professors Redish and Doernberg
portray the Supreme Court as defiant and usurping, but it is more
realistic to characterize the Court as engaged in a partnership
with Congress. Within this partnership, each institution performs
aspects of the jurisdictional law-making function that fall particu-
larly within its capacity. Congress sets the initial broad outlines of
jurisdiction; the Court adapts those statutes in response to actual
case settings; and Congress retains the ultimate power to redefine
jurisdiction, subject to constitutional limitations, defined by the
Court.57
What is objectionable about this arrangement? Professor
Redish can only propose a kind of clear statement rule: Congress
should expressly authorize the federal courts to make jurisdic-
tional law if it wants their assistance -silence implies lack of au-
thority.58 But why not, for the reasons described above, assume
55. For my own views about the advisability of the Younger doctrine, see generally
Althouse, The Misguided Search for State Interest in Abstention Cases: Observations on
the Occasion of Pennzoil v. Texaco, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1051 (1988) (federal interests sup-
port using the state courts to enforce federal law in their ongoing proceedings).
56. See Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 574 (1985)
("[T]he courts are functionally better adapted to engage in the necessary fine tuning than
is the legislature.")
57. For a similar and far more detailed account of the interaction between the courts
and Congress in making jurisdictional law, see Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The Su-
preme Court, Congress and Federal Jurisdiction, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. -, (1990)
(manuscript).
58. See Redish, Symposium, supra note 2, at 1031-33.
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authority, either as a matter, of federal common law power or as a
matter of implicit congressional authorization, unless Congress
says otherwise? Even if Professor Redish would prefer to assume a
lack of judicial power and rejects this partnership model of juris-
dictional lawmaking, he needs to explain separately how the Con-
stitution mandates his preference. Yet there is nothing to invoke
except judicial assertions to the effect that Congress has complete
power over federal jurisdiction, and these assertions are contra-
dicted by the very judicial practices he criticizes.
CONCLUSION
What substantial difference would the separation of powers
approach make? It would cut off one way of speaking about what
jurisdiction should be. It asks judges to submerge realistic think-
ing about how jurisdiction should be allocated and to restrict itself
to the language of textual interpretation. It is difficult to see how
this kind of constraint enhances the representative character of
government which Professor Redish emphasizes. How would more
judicial obfuscation improve the democratic process? Slogging
through the Court's elaborate discussions of the legislative history
of section 1983, which are rarely, if ever, convincing as a matter
of pure history, I have welcomed straightforward discussions of
policy. These passages are rays of light, illuminating the Court's
true motivations. 9 I am grateful for any frankness from the Court
about how it thinks cases should be allocated between federal and
state courts, and, more fundamentally, about how individual citi-
zens who claim violations of constitutional rights should fare
within the federal system. We may well disagree with these deci-
sions, but at least we can directly address the source of the disa-
greement. Centering the debate about federal jurisdiction on the
real issues at stake in the cases has far more potential for vital-
izing democracy than the futile attempt to constrain judges with
separation of powers theory.
Finally, with all of this concern that judges might intrude on
the legislative function and interfere with the will of the majority,
we should not forget the importance of preserving the judicial
function, particularly the role of the federal courts in protecting
59. See, e.g., Monell v. Department of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 711 (1978) (Pow-
ell, J., concurring) (stressing the need to find municipalities to be "persons" to avoid cast-
ing "grave doubt" over the exercise of jurisdiction over school boards in desegregation
cases).
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the rights of minorities. If we pound away at the Court with argu-
ments about how important it is to defer to Congress in the inter-
ests of democracy, we may unintentionally -push it into a genera-
lized position of restraint that will affect its view of constitutional
rights. Professor Redish, manifesting his usual tendency to believe
that it is possible to keep things neatly separated, assumes the
Court will be able to approach constitutional interpretation with
full vigor even though it has taken a position of extreme deference
in statutory interpretation.o But if the Court becomes dedicated
to a credo of congressional dominance, adopted in response to ar-
guments about statutes, it may find it difficult to rouse itself from
that passivity and carry out its counter-majoritarian role of en-
forcing constitutional rights. The separation of pow'ers theory
could undermine the Court's capacity to stand up to the Congress
and to engage in activism for the protection of the very rights that
make us care about jurisdiction in the first place.
60. See Redish, Symposium, supra note 2, at 1031 (finding it difficult "to compre-
hend how scholars could realistically suggest that recognition of the obligation to act when
so directed by the legislature, that is, of what is really a form of judicial humility in the
face of legislative directive, would somehow undermine the judiciary's performance of its
vital counter-majoritarian checking function").
Quite aside from the potential for ideas about the judiciary's nonrepresentative char-
acter and the value of judicial restraint to spill over into constitutional interpretation, statu-
tory and constitutional interpretation often arise together in the same case. The kind of
extreme deference to statutes advocated by Professor Redish would make it difficult for the
Court to give full play to a constitutional right that limits the reach of a statute.
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